Formal Proceedings
After being certified by the Fair Work Commission, the matter was transferred to Federal Circuit Court,
then to Australian Federal Court. In defense of its chronic pattern of administrative failures, Macquarie claimed ignorance.
And how did Australian courts treat Macquarie's conduct? In short, they gave it their Blue Ribbon Stamp of Approval.
Governing Statutes
Australian law purportedly protects employment:
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The Higher Education Legislation Amendment (HELA) required Macquarie to provide:
"direct consultation with employees on HR matters" and "fair and transparent.. performance management".
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The Fair Work (FW) and Workplace Relations (WR) Acts:
(1) Required Macquarie to register an approved AWA
(2) Prohibited Macquarie from altering the position of an employee to the employee’s prejudice, from discriminating between
an employee and others, or from dismissing an employee - because the employee (i) had or exercised a workplace right
or (ii) made a complaint or inquiry about his employment or (iii) because of the employee's political opinion
(viz opinion on governance and public affairs).
(3) Reversed onus of proof: The foregoing adverse actions are presumed to have been prohibited, unless proven otherwise.
In making this determination, the court was required to satisfy the following:
“The task of the court is to determine, on the balance of probabilities, why the employer took adverse action."
"This is a question of fact, which must be answered in light of all of the facts."
The proceedings failed these standards conspicuously.
Sequestration of Evidence
My research files and office property were seized by Macquarie in 2013, when Macquarie blocked access. Included were records
of my interactions with Macquarie that I had maintained. During the legal proceedings, Macquarie denied access to that property,
which was necessary to be heard on the issues. It was the same tactic Macquarie employed during its misconduct proceedings.
My records falsified claims by Macquarie. To complete my evidence in reply I had to seek access through subpoena
- of my own property. Macquarie objected, eventually claiming that the contents of my office, almost all of which
I had brought from the US (hundreds of books, journals, files, and dozens of volumes of handwritten equations
that I had assembled during my 30-year career) were now Macquarie's property. It was not the first such claim by Macquaurie.
I notified the court of concerns over due process:
“If Respondents are permitted to discriminate which interactions between the parties are heard,
while Applicant is prohibited from presenting the rest, how will the court judge the basis for adverse action?”
To my concern over access, the court simply responded: "You're in the wrong court."
If I wanted access to my records to be heard on the issues before this court, I would have to commence a separate action in another court.
I advised the court that opening a separate action to be heard on this one would render the two inextricably intertwined. Nevertheless,
the court set aside the subpoena, ordering limited access: Cartons in which the records were thought to have been packed by Macquarie
were ordered to be transferred to the court Registry, where both parties were to have "supervised access".
I notified Macquarie that I would be overseas during March 2015 to fulfill professional commitments. When I departed,
Macquarie sought and was granted an order for me to have access to my office property on one day - a day when
Macquarie knew that I would be overseas.
Upon returning in April, I discovered the events and notified the court of Macquarie's devious action - but the latest.
The court did not correct the matter. After Macquarie continued to refuse access, I had to seek access through another subpoena.
Macquarie again objected.
Macquarie's latest objection was heard only days before the final hearing. The court then ordered major submissions for that hearing.
I notified the court that, because of Macquarie's deception, I still had not been provided access to my records, which were necessary
for my evidence in reply - material which had been subpoenaed 6 months earlier and access to which had been ordered.
“How can I file submissions, when I haven’t been permitted to complete my evidence in reply? "
The court simply responded: “I am ordering that now”, leaving the untimely hearing in place.
"Now" was was 3:30 PM, just 3 business days before the week-long hearing. I promptly went to the Registry, which was preparing to close.
The Registry could not even find the cartons from my office.
I eventually located the material, which falsified Macquarie's representations. It was included in my evidence in reply and filed along with
my submissions in reply. Macquarie objected to the completion of my evidence. I notified the court that the delay was created entirely
by Macquarie - through its obstruction and devious request for me to have access on a day when Macquarie knew that I would be overseas. The court happily obliged Macquarie's request: It excluded my completed evidence. The treatment protected Macquarie's representations against challenge. It mirrored Macquarie's handling of its misconduct proceedings.
Erroneous Findings
Findings of the Federal Circuit Court were, in major part, a copy of Macquarie's written submissions - much of it verbatim.
Its rationalizations for endorsing Macquarie's conduct are falsified here and here. The court's uncritical adoption of Macquarie's submissions reproduced misrepresentations and errors, which are contradicted by the record.
Fundamental was the Employment Contract, which the court failed to determine correctly. The court found that,
because Macquarie did not register the AWA, my appointment was governed by the 2007 Enterprise Agreement.
This finding was central, underpinning much of the court's analysis and treatment of the issues. It was equally impossible.
I was exempt from the EA, as Macquarie notified me during recruitment:
“You are not covered by the Enterprise Agreement. The Agreement has an exemption..
It does not apply to staff who earn in excess of 15% above the maximum salary for a professor,
which obviously includes you.”
The EA could not even apply to me. It could hardly supplant terms of the AWA that formed the foundation of the Employment Contract.
As Solicitor recognized in her letter to Macquarie:
“The matter is one of simple contract law. The fact that the AWA was not registered
is irrelevant to the extent that its terms still form part of my client’s employment contract.”
As the finding of what comprised the Employment Contract was incorrect, so too were findings of its Breach and Adverse action,
issues that were predicated upon it. It's noteworthy that this central finding legitimized the removal of 90% of the Employment Contract,
to which the parties had agreed, and virtually all of the employment protections. Derived from Macquarie's failure to register the AWA,
it violated a precept of English law. The Rule of Construction requires that "a party may not benefit from its own wrongdoing."
Similarly, the court parroted Macquarie's representation of the Startup Package, (1) disregarding the technical resources that Macquarie pledged in writing to provide, (2) disregarding the hiring freeze which was in place when Macquarie pledged that technical support
but which Macquarie did not disclose and would prevent that support from being acquired - until I was either retired or dead,
and (3) disregarding Macquarie's retroactive alteration of the Startup Package Agreement and then its subversion by withholding
the travel support that Macquarie had approved. Macquarie was again permitted to benefit from its wrongdoing.
The court disregarded protections in the Higher Education Legislation Amendment by likewise parroting Macquarie's representation -
that the HELA was only "a bill"and therefore not law. Yet the record showed that the HELA was enacted by Parliament in November 2005.
Macquarie's failure to register the AWA just happened to circumvent a fundamental protection that Macquarie had offered:
Regulatory oversight by an independent third party. The court found that the failure to fulfill this responsibility
wasn't Macquarie's fault. It must have been Salby's fault. Salby must not have given Macquarie the signed AWA.
The finding is contradicted by the record. Regardless, the court's finding transferred the responsibility from the Australian employer
to a foreign resident - a party who was ignorant of Australian employment law and was not even governed by it.
The court permitted Macquarie to sequester and then exclude my evidence. Consequently, the court could not have made
a proper determination of the reversed onus of proof:
"To determine, on the balance of probabilities, why the employer took adverse action
-a question of fact, which must be answered in light of all of the facts".
On the "balance of probabilities", the record already made clear that discharging the reversed onus was prohibited.
Macquarie had numerous avenues that would have averted adverse action - conspicuously, to simply engage in discussion.
Had Macquarie not disregarded every one of those required avenues of dispute resolution, then its excuse for termination
would have disintegrated. It follows that, on the balance of probabilities:
(1) Macquarie's explanations for termination and the adverse actions which precipitated it
reduce to a set of probability zero : virtually impossible. The reversed onus of proof must stand.
(2) The chain of adverse actions could only have been taken because Macquarie wished
to no longer be bound by the Employment Contract and Startup Package Agreement.
The Circuit Court's erroneous finding of what comprised the Employment Contract was fatal. It invalidated the court's treatment
of other issues. Along with others, this erroneous finding was reviewed by Federal Court - not by a judge, but a justice.
The justice was unconcerned that the court's error would render Australian employment contracts discredited.
To eliminate the contradictions of this central finding (a failure admitted even by Macquarie),
the justice had to re-write the record. He invented new language. The justice could then argue that
Salby’s employment was governed, not by terms of the AWA, to which the parties had agreed and Macquarie breached,
but by the EA, which the parties had agreed to exclude.
The justice's treatment was tantamount to rewriting the Employment Contract, as well as the EA.
In fact, Macquarie's notice (above) makes it clear that even Macquarie understood that I was exempt from the EA.
There is no ambiguity on what comprised the Employment Contract. Even if there was, it must be resolved according to
a fundamental principle of contract law: Contra proferentem requires such ambiguity to be resolved in favor of the party
who did not introduce the ambiguity.
As the finding of what comprised the Employment Contract was incorrect, so too were findings predicated upon it,
notably, concerning its [B]reach and Adverse Action.
Other findings were either likewise contradicted by the record or simply not considered. Noteworthy was Macquarie's improper
reduction of my salary - without the required PDR, in disregard of the "agreed performance criteria", and while Macquarie withheld
the startup resources it had pledged to enable me to function professionally. As it significantly reduced my salary from that at which
I had been recruited, this breach was fundamental - It repudiated of the Employment Contract. The justice simply ignored it.
Implications
The courts' endorsement of Macquarie's conduct, even if it required re-writing the record, makes the significance of an Australian Employment Contract and underpinning legal protections clear. A foreign recruit can enter into a binding contract with an Australian employer but, after relocating, find that the employer has simply disregarded its responsibilities to activate the underpinning protections
- responsibilities of which the foreign recruit has neither knowledge nor control. The Australian employer can then fail to honor
the Employment Contract as well as other written agreements, can refuse to even discuss the ensuing issues, and can then
disregard the most basic employment protections, even confiscate the employee's records of the employer's conduct -
because, as this precedent establishes, the Australian employer will not be held accountable.
Epilogue
Macquarie's International Standing
I joined Macquarie on the premise of its proclaimed new direction - to become [internationally] recognized in research.
When I joined Macquarie, it was ranked in the bottom third of world universities. Its ranking when it terminated my appointment
(after chronic obstruction of research and research teaching) appears here. Macquarie remains in the bottom third of world universities.